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Standard choice models implicitly assume that consumers, in order 
to maximize their expected utilities, compare each of the alternatives 
in their choice sets in terms of all available attributes. Consumer-level 
utility functions are frequently taken as linear, and overwhelmingly so as 
compensatory. However, due to limitations in information process capacity, 
characteristics of choice task environment and other internal or external 
constraints, consumers may search for satisfying alternatives rather than 
optimal ones by invoking other non-compensatory heuristics which free 
them from arduous attribute-by-attribute comparison. The question arises 
as to how often these non-compensatory rules are applied, and whether 
researchers can detect them using only standard data sources.
This study aims to address two main issues regarding consumers’ use 
of decision-rules and heuristics in the real world: (1) whether they are 
heterogeneous across consumers and (2) whether they are changing for 
individual consumers over time. To these ends, we extend the standard 
linear compensatory rule assumption to more faithfully capture dynamic 
heuristic usage for each consumer. There are three reference heuristics 
studied in this paper, the well-known linear compensatory, disjunctive and 
conjunctive rules. Conditional on this known set of possible heuristics, a 
dynamic heterogeneous hidden Markov mixture choice model is developed 
to capture heuristic dynamics at the individual-level. When estimated 
on detergent scanner data, the proposed model offers strong evidence 
supporting both heterogeneity and dynamics in heuristics usage.
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1. inTRoDUCTion
Standard random utility models of consumer choice, with few 
exceptions, assume that compensatory rules capture the comparison 
process for multiattribute alternatives. Underlying this presumption, 
though seldom stated as such, is the belief that to make a choice 
requires that all alternatives in one’s choice set are compared on all 
relevant attributes. Compensatory rules simply require as much, 
since good results on one valued attribute can offset deficiencies 
in another. By far the most popular and widely-applied of the 
compensatory rules is the linear-additive, simply a weighted sum 
of attributes which can presumably be easily compared across 
potential choices to arrive at the one offering ‘maximal expected 
utility’.
There is, however, a large literature showing that choices in 
the real world are often sub-optimal, at least compared with 
what one might have chosen with limitless information, time and 
cognitive resources. Subject to limitations in processing capacity, 
consumers may use seemingly sub-optimal satisfying rules by 
searching through a set of alternatives until a satisfactory one is 
found (cf., Simon 1975). For example, Tversky (1972) maintained 
that unsatisfactory alternatives are eliminated by sequentially 
(and probabilisitically) picking aspects until only one alternative 
remains. This EBA-based rule is intrinsically non-compensatory: 
once an alternative is eliminated, how strong it might have been on 
remaining attribute comparisons is irrelevant. An appealing feature 
of such heuristics or rules-of-thumb is that they can free consumers 
from long sequences of complex calculations. The savings in time 
and effort are offset, of course, by the decrement in the quality or 
utility of the chosen item. Simply put, non-compensatory heuristics 
offer simplicity at the potential cost of optimality.
Previous studies have proposed various types of heuristics, among 
them linear compensatory, disjunctive, conjunctive, lexicographic, 
elimination-by-aspects, lexicographic semiorder, min-max and 
max-min rules (cf., Bettman 1979; Wright 1975). An interesting 
empirical question is which of these choice heuristics is most widely 
used by consumers. Most previous behavioral studies on heuristics 
were conducted in a laboratory setting, and so could not provide 
conclusive evidence about consumers’ heuristics usage in the real 
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world. Other disciplines such as statistical or econometric modeling 
have also been nearly silent on the question, instead using the 
standard linear-compensatory rule in the lion’s share of empirical 
field studies.
However, several studies in empirical modeling did attempt to 
deviate from the assumption of compensatory heuristics. Most 
of these studies were, however, two-stage choice models (cf., 
Gensch 1987; Manrai and Sinha 1989; Roberts and Lattin 1991): 
(1) a screening stage for the formation of consideration sets and 
(2) a choice decision stage given consideration sets. The second 
choice stage was typically assumed to follow compensatory choice 
heuristics. Other studies also introduced parameters to capture 
probabilities of alternatives passing the first screening stage (Chiang 
et al. 1999; Swait 1987; Gaudry and Dagenais 1979; Siddarth 
et al. 1995), although these studies did not incorporate non-
compensatory heuristics for the first screening stage explicitly. Only 
a few studies explicitly introduced non-compensatory heuristics 
at the first screening stage: a feature-based elimination process 
similar to elimination-by-aspect heuristics (Andrews and Manrai 
1998; Gilbride and Allenby 2006) and conjunctive/disjunctive 
heuristics (Gilbride and Allenby 2004). However, these two studies 
could not fully address consumers’ heuristics usage, since a 
hybrid decision process – non-compensatory heuristics followed by 
compensatory ones – was assumed a priori; such presumed hybrid 
choice decision processes preclude other possibilities, for example, 
that there are some consumers who do not use non-compensatory 
rules, or that compensatory rules precede non-comepensatory 
rules for some consumers. To address real-world heuristics usage, 
it seems important to capture heterogeneity of heuristics usage 
across consumers without such presumed hybrid choice-decision 
processes.
Furthermore, it is also possible that consumers’ heuristics are 
not constant, but vary with experience. One can identify at least 
two reasons why heuristics might change over time. The learning 
hypothesis suggests that the realization of outcomes of previously 
chosen alternatives through consumption provides consumers with 
knowledge about the adequacy of the choice heuristics previously 
used (Bettman 1979). If a choice heuristic leads to an unsatisfying 
outcome, consumers may shift to other, different heuristics on 
the next choice task. An second possible explanation involves 
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characteristics of the external choice environment. For example, 
Wright (1975) found that compensatory rules are likely to be used 
less frequently as the number of alternatives increases. Payne (1982) 
also found that simplifying heuristics are preferred under time 
pressure in complex decision environments.
This paper aims to develop a comprehensive model of individual-
level, dynamic consumer heuristics usage in real shopping 
environments, using only standard data sources. Specifically, 
we address two major issues: (1) whether heuristic usage is 
heterogeneous across consumers and (2) whether heuristics 
themselves are dynamic at the individual-level. To do so, we relax 
the standard linear compensatory rule assumption, and propose a 
heterogeneous dynamic hidden Markov mixture choice model.
The choice literature is replete with potential heuristics among 
which a consumer might choose. While the proposed methodology 
can readily accommodate a wide variety of heuristics, here we use 
just three most common reference heuristics (as did Gilbride and 
Allenby (2004)):
 
1.  Linear compensatory rule: All alternatives are compared in 
terms of all attributes, using attribute-specific importance 
weights. The important feature is that positive and negative 
deviations among attributes can balance or compensate for one 
another, in this case in a linear fashion. Linear compensatory 
rule therefore requires substantial computational processing of 
trade-offs among attributes. This choice heuristics has been ‘gold 
standard’ in random utility theory.
2.  Disjunctive rule: A non-compensatory heuristic wherein 
consumers are assumed to have minimal standards, or cutoffs, 
for each attribute. Acceptable alternatives are ones that pass 
at least one such cutoff. If there are multiple acceptable 
alternatives, it is not clear which of these alternatives is chosen. 
The disjunctive rule is commonly invoked when the chosen 
product must be greatly superior along one dimension.
3.  Conjunctive rule: A non-compensatory heuristic under which, 
like in the disjunctive rule, consumers are assumed to have 
minimum attribute cutoffs (which may be different from those 
in the disjunctive rule). However, acceptable alternatives must 
surpass all cutoffs, not merely one. Conjunctive rules are 
common for multi-attribute decisions where choices must be 
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‘good enough’ along every relevant dimension. 
First, each of these three heuristics is formulated so that 
all unknown parameters (e.g., consumer-specific weights for 
explanatory variables in the linear compensatory rule, and 
consumer-specific cutoffs in the conjunctive and the disjunctive 
rules) are fully heterogeneous. Then, a heterogeneous mixing 
distribution is introduced to estimate consumer-specific probabilities 
across the three heuristics. Finally, a hidden Markov structure is 
used to capture the dynamic heuristics usage for each consumer.
This model will allow us to settle several outstanding issues in 
the choice literature, among them: (1) Which of these heuristics is 
most widely used by consumers in real-world choice scenarios?; (2) 
Do consumers differ in terms of the heuristics they employ (in the 
same product class)?; and, finally (3) Do consumers tend to stick to 
a particular type of heuristic, or do they switch among them over 
time?
2. MoDel SpeCifiCATion
In this section we describe a model designed to capture heuristics 
dynamics at the individual consumer level. Throughout, we use 
three generic subscripts: h denotes a household (h = 1, …, H), j 
denotes a brand (j = 1, …, J ) and t denotes a purchase occasion (t = 1, 
…, Th).
Let yht = j denote the event that household h purchases brand j 
on its purchase occasion t. Let xhjt denote a K-dimensional covariate 
vector for household h, brand j and purchase occasion t. Suppose 
that the covariate vector xhjt = (x̂ ′hjt; x̃ ′hjt)′ consists of two sub-vectors: 
(1) a M-dimensional vector of covariates that cutoff levels can be 
defined, x̃ hjt, and (2) a (K – M)-dimensional vector of remaining 
covariates, x̂hjt. Let zh denote a M-dimensional vector of cutoff levels 
for household h corresponding to x̃hjt.
For non-compensatory choice rules, let qhjt,m (m = 1, …, M) denote 
an latent indicator variable for the event that a m-th covariate for a 
brand, x̃hjt,m passes the corresponding cutoff level, zh,m:
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where IA is the usual indicator function for the event A.
In addition, let sht denote a latent discrete random variable 
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where zh
(3) is a vector of cutoffs specific to the conjunctive rule. 
In (4) and (5), we assume one of the brands in Eiht, i = 2 and 3, 
is uniformly chosen if Eiht is not a singleton set. This assumption 
is made not only because there does not exist any sound theories 
guiding which of brands in Eiht is chosen but also because any 
brands of Eiht can be chosen by definition. Gilbride and Allenby 
(2004) assumed that compensatory rule would be employed to make 
choices among brands of Eiht. Aside from that their assumption 
was made without any theoretical justifications, the compensatory 
processing of brands in Eiht are problematic in some cases, for 
example, where all brands have exactly same values for all or some 
covariates, or Eiht is a singleton set. Furthermore, their assumption 
suffers from a redundancy problem in a sense that covariates 
employed for the construction of Eiht are used again for making 
comparisons between brands. Covariates employed for the first 
screening stage may, in fact, be irrelevant to choices among brands 
of Eiht since all brands of E
i
ht cannot be differentiated in terms of their 
attractiveness by definition. Following Bettman’s (1975) argument, 
we also allow that cutoff levels can differ for the disjunctive and 
conjunctive rules, an issue we will examine empirically.
Given these three heuristics, this study will investigate the 
heterogeneity and the dynamics in heuristics usage. The three 
reference heuristics were chosen largely because they are the 
most widely studied in the choice literature. Even though they 
are certainly not the only such and adding others is readily 
accomplished, we feel that these three may provide sufficient setting 
for investigating dynamics and heterogeneity in heuristics usage.
2.1  Modeling Changes in Heuristics over Time
Households are allowed to adopt different heuristics across their 
purchase occasions. In order to capture changes in heuristics over 
time, let us assume that the latent finite state random variable – we 
will never observe it directly – sht ∈ {1, 2, 3} evolves according to a 
Markov process:
ht h ts s Markov, 1 1| ( , ),π− ∆  (6)
 
where π1 is the initial probability distribution at the first purchase 
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occasion and Δ = {δmn} is a 3 × 3 one-step transition probability 




















For identifiability, we invoke the standard assumption the chain 
is time-homogeneous, irreducible, and aperiodic for all households. 
Let h h h h
(1) (2) (3)= { , , }φ φ φ φ  denote a set of parameters for heuristics i, i = 1, 
2, 3, that is, h h h hz
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2.2  Competing Models
Depending on the assumptions for π1 and Δ, we have several 
competing models. Define δi = (δi1, δi2, δi3), i = 1, 2, 3. Table 0 lists five 
such models and their imposed assumptions.
Comparisons among models M1, M2 and M3 allows one to test 
which of the three reference heuristics is most preferred under 
Table 1. List of comepeting models
Model π1 Δ
M1: Linear compensatory rule (1, 0, 0) δ1 = (1, 0, 0); δ2 = δ3 = 03
M2: Disjunctive rule (0, 1, 0) δ1 = 03; δ2 = (0, 1, 0); δ3 = 03
M3: Conjunctive rule (0, 0, 1) δ1 = 03; δ2 = 03; δ3 = (0, 0, 1)
M4: Static mixture model NR* δ1 = (1, 0, 0); δ2 = (0, 1, 0); δ3 = (0, 0, 1) 
M5: Dynamic mixture model NR NR
Note: *: no restriction
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the homogeneous heuristics assumption. Model M4 allows one 
to examine the heterogeneity in heuristics across households, 
assuming that they do not change over time. Finally, model M5 
captures both heuristic heterogeneity and dynamics. In this way, 
M1 – M5 suffice to discern among competing behavioral theories 
of heuristic usage, using no more than observed, consumer-level 
choices.
2.3  Modeling parameters Associated with Heuristics
All parameters associated with heuristics, ϕh, are assumed to be 
heterogeneous across households. For the linear compensatory rule, 
we model βh as multivariate normal random-effects:
h KN ( , ),β ββ µ Σ  (8)
 
a K-variate normal distribution with a mean vector μβ and a 
covariance matrix Σβ.
Let nd and nc denote the number of discrete and continuous 
variables in zh, respectively, where M = nd + nc. Then, for cutoffs, zh
(i), 
i = 2, 3,
 
1. i i ihn nq nq nq dz r n n
( ) ( ) ( )Pr( = | ) = , = 1, ,θ θ  , q = 1, …, Qn, when zhn
(i) ∈ {rn1, 
…, rn,Qn} is a discrete variable,
2. i i i ihn n hn n dz z n n M
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Pr( | ) = ( | ), = 1, ,ξ η ξ +  , when zh,n
(i) is a con-
tinuous variable. The function η(zhn
(i) | ξn
(i)) denotes a probability 
distribution with parameter ξn
(i). While any continuous probability 
distribution functions can be used for η(•), in this paper we assume: 
i i i i i i
hn n n hn n nz N z
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Pr( | , ) = ( | , ),µ σ µ σ  (9)
a univariate normal distribution with mean ηn




( ) ( ) ( )= ( , )ξ µ σ . 
D e f i n e  i i i( ) ( ) ( )= { , }θ ξΨ ,  i  =  2 ,  3 ,  w h e r e  i i ind
( ) ( ) ( )
1= { , , }θ θ θ , 
i i i
n n nQn
( ) ( ) ( )
1= { , , }θ θ θ  and 
i i i
nc
( ) ( ) ( )
1= { , , }ξ ξ ξ . Then, rewrite 
i i
hn nq nqz r
( ) ( )Pr( = | )θ  
and i i ihn n nz
( ) ( ) ( )Pr( | , )µ σ  together as 
i i
hp z i
( ) ( )( | ), = 2, 3.Ψ  (10)
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2.4  prior
The model specification is completed with the following priors:
Dir l l l h1 1 2 3( , , ) forπ ∀  (11)
n n n n n nDir d d d n h1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) ( , , ), = 1, 2, 3, forδ δ δ ∀  (12)
KN f V( , ),β β βµ   (13)
KIW v S( , ),β β βΣ   (14)
i
n n n Q dn
Dir e e ,n n i( ) 1 ,( , , ) = 1, , and = 2, 3,θ     (15)
i
n n n dN f v n n M i
( ) ( , ), = 1, , and = 2, 3,µ +   (16)
i
n n n dIG l g n n M i ,
( ) ( , ), = 1, , and = 2, 3σ +   (17)
Here Dir(a1, …, an) is a Dirichlet distribution with parameters a1, …, 
an. The expression Σ ~ IWK(v, S) denotes that Σ has a K-dimensional 
inverted Wishart distribution with parameters v and S, where v > 0 
and S is non-singular, that is, v Kp v S  S
1( ) 12
1( | , ) exp( tr ).
2
− + −Σ ∝ Σ − Σ  
In addition, the expression σ ~ IG(l, g) denotes an inverse gamma 
distribution with shape parameter l and scale parameter g, that is, 
l gl g e( 1) /( | , ) σσ σ − + −∝ . Note that all parameters for priors listed above 
are known values.
3  eMpiRiCAl AppliCATion
3.1  Data and independent Variables
The proposed model was fitted to an A. C. Nielson liquid detergent 
scanner data set for four brands over 96 weeks. Liquid detergent 
data provide a particularly stringent arena for the detection of choice 
heuristic heterogeneity and dynamics, given that the category is 
not characterized by high differentiation or great variation amongst 
usage occasions. The data consisted of 492 households that made 
purchases at least six times during the 96 week period. The total 
number of purchase observations was 6682, and summaries of the 
data are given in Table 2. 
For the linear compensatory rule, we introduced three brand 
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dummy variables and three marketing-mix variables. To ensure 
identifiability, the regression coefficient of the fourth brand was 
fixed to zero for all households. The predictor variables xhjt for brand 
j and household h at purchase occasion t were:
 hjtx
dummy variable for brand A
dummy variable for brand B
dummy variable for brand C
= .
dummy variable for feature advertising
dummy variable for display











For the conjunctive and disjunctive rules, there were M = 4 
attributes for cutoffs as given in Table 3. Note that zh2
(i ) and zh3
(i ), 
i = 2, 3, are defined as binary variables. For example, if zh2
(i) = 0, 
households can be thought of as indifferent to feature advertising. 
The cut-off prices are assumed to be bounded in an interval of [min 
(observed prices), max (observed prices)].
Finally, the chosen values for the priors are 
nl n= 1, = 1, 2, 3,
n n nd d d n1 2 3= = = 1, = 1, 2, 3
f V I v S I6 6 6= 0 , = 30 , = 2, = 30 ,β β β β
i
n he n z i
( )
1 1= 1, = 1, ,15, for , = 2, 3,
i i
n n h he e n   z   z  i
( ) ( )
2 3 2 3= = 1, = 1, 2, for and for , = 2, 3,
i
hf v l g ,  z  i
( )
4 4 4 4 4= 5.5, = 10, = 3, = 10 for , = 2, 3.
Table 2. Marketing activities of brands in the liquid detergent data
Brand A Brand B Brand C Brand D
Choice share 30.0% 28.4% 18.9% 22.8%
Proportion of observations with 
feature advertising 
23.3% 21.7% 6.4% 11.8%
Proportion of observations with 
display 
14.8% 13.5% 6.8% 9.5%
Average and standard deviation 
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3.2  estimation Results
All models listed in Table 0 were estimated by MCMC – see 
Appendix for technical details. Model M1 is readily estimated by 
skipping the MCMC steps for s, π1, Δ, z
(2), z(3), Ψ(2) and Ψ(2) under the 
restriction sht = 1 for ∀h,t. Similarly, M2 and M3 can be estimated by 
skipping MCMC steps for s, π1, Δ, β, μβ and Σβ under the condition 
sht = 2 or 3, for ∀h,t, and M4 by skipping the step for Δ under the 
restriction Δ = I3.
After 5,000 iterations, all models seemed to reach convergence, 
judged by monitoring Geweke’s (1992) convergence diagnostic. 
Across all models, the proportion of quantities that passed Geweke’s 
convergence diagnostic ranged from 94.7% to 100%. All inferences 
reported here are based on the next 15,000 iterations.
3.2.1  Choice of the Most Preferred Model
After estimating M1 – M5, integrated likelihoods were computed. 
The computed integrated likelihoods and the Bayes factors for 
comparison of models M1 and Mi (BFM1,Mi) are given in Table 4.
The first hypotheses to test is:
a
a
H M M M
H M
( )
0 1 2 3
( )
1 4
: Heuristics are homogeneous across households ( , , )
: Heuristics are heterogeneous across households ( ).
Because BFMi,M4, i = 1, 2, 3, are all smaller than 1, households’ 
heuristics usage is apparently not homogeneous. However, among 
the three homogeneous models, M1 – M3, the linear compensatory 






(3 ) Brands 
preferred 
Discrete 
(Q1 = 15) 
1(A), 2(B), 3(C), 4(D), 5(AB), 6(AC), 
7(AD), 8(BC), 9(BD), 10(CD), 11(ABC), 
12(ABD), 13(ACD), 14(BCD), 15(ABCD) 
zh2
(2 ), zh2
(3 ) Feature Ad Discrete(Q2 = 2) 0 (indifferent), 1 (feature ad on) 
zh3
(2 ), zh3
(3 ) Display Discrete(Q3 = 2) 0 (indifferent),  1 (display on) 
zh4
(2 ), zh4
(3 ) Net-paid Price Continuous [$2.82, $10.48] 
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model, M1, is preferred, suggesting that a randomly chosen 
household may be most likely to invoke the linear compensatory rule 
on a typical choice occasion. However, the heterogeneous heuristics 
model, M4, is decisively preferred even to M1. The posterior mean of 
mixing proportion of π1 in M4 were (0.7845, 0.0552, 0.1603), with 
standard deviations (0.0257, 0.0175, 0.0253), implying that 78.5% of 
households, ceteris paribus, appear to use the linear compensatory 
rule. All told, then, the null hypothesis H0
(a) was rejected.









: Heuristics do not change across purchase occasions ( )
: Heuristics do change across purchase occasions ( )
Since log(BFM4, M5) = –1532.38, the proposed dynamic hidden 
Markov mixture choice model, M5, is greatly preferred to M4, 
implying that households indeed adopt different heuristics across 
their purchase occasions.
Table 4 of fers rather strong evidence supporting both 
heterogeneity and dynamics in heuristics usage. In the sequel, 
we shall examine M5 in more detail. Throughout the discussion, 
statistical inferences on α = a vs α ≠ a for a quantity α will be made 
by examining whether the [2.5 percentile, 97.5 percentile] interval 
of the posterior distribution of α includes a. In addition, a statistical 
meaningful difference between two quantities, α and γ, will be 
determined by comparing a statistic m m
v v
( , ) = α
α γ
γτ α γ −
+
 against a 
critical value ±1.96, where mi and vi denote the posterior mean and 
the posterior variance of quantity i.
3.2.2  Estimates of π1 and Δ
As given in Table 5, the proportions of households that used 
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linear compensatory, disjunctive and conjunctive rules on their first 
purchase occasions were 73.2%, 5.6%, and 21.2%, respectively. In 
order to test whether there is a statistically meaningful difference 




(i ) denotes the estimate of the n-th element of π1 
under model Mi. The computed quantities were (1.17, –0.02, –0.88), 
implying that the estimates of π1 under M4 and M5 are essentially the 
same. 
Table 6 gives the estimate of the Markov transition matrix, Δ, 
showing that there were non-zero probabilities for switching among 
three heuristics. For example, if a household used the linear 
compensatory rule on its last purchase occasion, the household is 
likely to use the linear compensatory, disjunctive and conjunctive 
rules on the current purchase occasion with probabilities {0.86, 
0.01, 0.13}. Across all possible states at the last purchase occasion, 
sh,t–1, transition probabilities to the linear compensatory rule, p(sh,t 
= 1 | sh,t–1), are noticeably higher than those to the other non-
compensatory rules, p(sh,t = 2 | sh,t–1) and p(sh,t = 3 | sh,t–1).
It is also interesting to examine whether the proportions of 
Table 5. Estimate of π1
Estimate (std. dev.) [2.5 percentile, 97.5 percentile]
Pr(sh1 = 1) 0.7322 (0.0364) [0.6578, 0.8007] 
0.0561 (0.0369) [0.0040, 0.1449]
0.2116 (0.0520) [0.1043, 0.3076]
Pr(sh1 = 2)
Pr(sh1 = 3)






















Note:  *: posterior mean; **: posterior std. dev.; ***: [2.5 percentile, 97.5 
percentile] interval
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households for three heuristics are close to an equilibrium. If 
a large number of consumers in the data set are still learning 
about adequate choice heuristics, the proportions are unlikely 
to have reached an equilibrium. However, since our data set can 
be characterized by mundane purchases and there was not a 
statistically meaningful difference in the estimates of π1 across 
M4 and M5, the proportions are expected have approached to an 
equilibrium. To examine this, we computed π∞ = limt→∞πt, where πt 
= Δπt–1, given MCMC chains of π1 and Δ (cf., Amemiya 1986). The 
estimate of π∞, π̂∞, was (0.7955, 0.0221, 0.1824) with standard 
deviation (0.0118, 0.0071, 0.0134). Finally, the values of τ(π̂∞,n, π̂∞,n
(5)) 
were (1.65, –0.90, –0.54), implying that π1 and π∞ do not differ.
3.2.3  Estimates of s
The proposed hidden Markov dynamic mixture choice model, 
M5, allows one to estimate sht for each h = 1, …, H and t = 1, …, Th. 
Figure 1 is the histogram of simulated values of s492,2 and s492,6 and 
serves as a representative example. The modal values of s492,2 and 
s492,6 were 3 and 1, respectively, suggesting that household h = 492 
likely used conjunctive and linear compensatory rules on its second 
and sixth purchase occasions, respectively. Figure 2 presents 
plots of estimates of p(sht = i ), i = 1, 2, 3, for four randomly chosen 
households. All households (with the exception of h = 137) displayed 
varying heuristics usage across their purchase occasions.
Next, we examined the modal values of sht, ŝht, for each h = 1, …, 
H and t = 1, …, Th. Figure 3 presents a plot of {ŝht}
Th
t=1 for h = 189 
and 215, which indicates these two households did use different 
























(b) States for t=6
Figure 1. Histogram of simulated values of s492,2 and s492,6
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they tended to use the linear compensatory rule on most purchase 
occasions, but frequently switched to the conjunctive rule. 
Analogous examination conducted for other households indicates 
that, among 492 households, 259 households (52.6%) showed 
changes in ŝht across purchase occasions. The remaining 233 
households used only the linear compensatory rule. Examination 
of ŝht thus supports the dynamics of heuristics for a large number 
of households, and further suggest that a sizeable proportion’s 
choice patterns are consistent with the linear compensatory rule 
exclusively.
3.2.4   Estimates of Parameters Associated with Three Choice 
Heuristics
Estimates of  Regression Coef f icients of  the Linear 
Compensatory Rule
































































Figure 2. Plot of posterior probabilities of states across purchase 
occasions
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compensatory rule. Table 7 lists estimates of μβ and the diagonal 
elements of Σβ. All elements of μβ except the coefficient of the brand 
C dummy variable were significantly different from zero (i.e., 
[2.5 percentile, 97.5 percentile] intervals do not include zero). All 
estimates of feature ad, display and price showed expected signs.
In order to invoke the linear compensatory rule, M1, a household 
would need to conduct careful comparisons of all attributes across 
all brands. However, if a subset of households used other non-
compensatory heuristics, M1 is likely to under- or over-estimate 
the magnitude of true regression coefficients. Figure 4 is a 
hypothetical illustration of this point. Suppose that there is only 
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Figure 3. Changes in states across purchase occasions
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are divided into two groups in terms of heuristics usage: group C 
uses the linear compensatory rule, while group NC uses the non-
compensatory rules. The lines UC and UNC depict the hypothetical 
true utility functions for groups C and NC, respectively. Note that 
the utility function of the group NC is a step function, given a cut-
off w. In this case, if a researcher fits M1 to an aggregate data 
set containing both groups of consumers, the estimated utility 
function may underestimate the true utility function UC – see U*. 
Note that intercepts are same for both UC and U*, as implied by M1. 
It is similarly straightforward to lay out a case where regression 
coefficients are over-estimated by M1.
To examine this possibility, the estimate of μβ under M5 was 
compared with that under M1 (note that the estimate of μβ under M5 
is obtained only from households that used the linear compensatory 
rule). As in Table 8, which lists the relevant comparison figures, 
the absolute values of all estimates of μβ under M1 was smaller than 
those under M5, implying that the effects of marketing activities 
under M1 might systemically be underestimated. In order to further 
examine whether the differences were statistically meaningful, 
values of τ(βn
(1), βn
(5)) are listed in the table, where βn
(i) is the estimate of 
the n-th element in β under model Mi. The values of τ(βn
(1), βn
(5)) suggest 
that there was a statistically meaningful difference in the estimates 
of the price coefficients across the two models. That is, M1 might well 
Table 7. Estimates of μβ and diag(Σβ)
 μβ diag(Σβ)
























Note: *: estimate; **: std.dev.; ***: [2.5 percentile, 97.5 percentile] interval
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under-estimate regression coefficients for price. 
Estimates of Cutoff Levels for the Non-compensatory Heuristics
Rather than reporting the summaries of the population 
distribution of cutoffs, we examine the estimates, zh
(2) and zh
(3), directly 
in order to investigate the cutoff phenomenon in more detail. To 
examine the posterior distribution of zh
(2) and zh
(3), simulated values of 
zh
(2) and zh
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Figure 4. An example of the under-estimation case for regression 
coefficients in M1
Table 8. Comparison of estimates of μβ between M1 and M5
 Under M1 Under M5 τ(βn
(1), βn
(5))
Brand A dummy –0.8989(0.1843) –1.1208(0.2263) -.7605
Brand B dummy 1.0738(0.2033) 1.4596(0.2556) –1.1814
Brand C dummy –0.0922(0.2228) 0.1511(0.2716) –0.6926
Feature ad 0.5276(0.1790) 0.7038(0.2200) –0.6215
Display 0.6602(0.1902) 0.8808(0.2242) –0.7505
Price –2.7716(0.1629) –4.1210(0.2253) 4.8535
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These results indicate that households were more likely to contain 
singleton sets of preferred brands when they used the disjunctive 
than the conjunctive rule. This makes sense, on its face: households 
having a single preferred brand may focus on maximizing one 
desired attribute, such as price. Note that feature ad, display and 
price clearly affected households’ choices in the disjunctive rule. By 
contrast, for the conjunctive rule, all households were completely 
indifferent to feature ad and display, while the household-specific 
sets of preferred brands and cutoff prices are the main drivers of 
purchase decisions. Note that the proportion estimates for the 15 (= 
24 – 1) possible brand sets (composed of four brands) were different 
from a uniform distribution of 1/15, so that there is meaningful 
variation in terms of the set of preferred brands across households. 
It is noticeable that the proportion the full brand sets, {A, B, C, D} 
dominated other brand sets in the conjunctive rule. Again, this is 
not surprising: households which engage in detailed processing, 
as the compensatory rule requires, are more likely to consider a 
wider range of brands, all else equal. However, even with the full 
set of brands, households can well eliminate a subset thereof by 
comparing offered prices against their cutoffs.
Bettman (1975) argued that cutoffs can vary across the 
disjunctive and the conjunctive rules. Figure 5 supports his 
argument for the set of preferred brands, feature ad and display. 
However, his argument was not supported for price variable. The 
means and standard deviations of cutoff prices across households 
were $6.31 and 0.07 in the disjunctive rule and $6.92 and 0.49 
in the conjunctive rule, implying the means of cutoff prices were 
essentially the same (τ = –1.23).
Let us examine the implication of price cutoffs in more detail. 
Any prices below the cutoff levels can not affect households’ choice 
decisions if conjunctive or disjunctive rules were used. Therefore, 
the knowledge of the households’ cutoff values are important inputs 
for pricing decisions; the existence of price tiers is well-documented, 
as is the asymmetric switching phenomenon, where households 
react differently to price promotions for high-price and low-price 
brands (e.g., Bronnenberg and Wathieu 1996). To illustrate usage 
of the estimated cutoff prices for households, let us consider the 
conjunctive rule. Given the estimates of household-specific cut-off 
prices for the conjunctive rule, it is easy to examine the proportion 
of households for which their cutoff prices are grater than, or equal 
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to, a given price ranging from $2.82 to $10.48. Figure 6 presents 
the plot of such proportions. The choice share of a given brand can 
be increased by increasing the number of households when Eht
(3) 
contains the brand. Figure 13 suggests that all households (among 
those who use the conjunctive rule) will have the brand in their E ht
(3) 
for prices in [$2.82, $5.99]. Certainly, any prices below $5.99 cannot 
be optimal.
3.2.5  Causes of Changes in Choice Heuristics over Time
Given the estimate of heuristic variation over time for each 















































































































Figure 5. Plot of cut-off values for disjuctive and conjuctive rules
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household – the modal values of sht – one might wonder what drives 
such changes. In this section, we test a possible explanation for the 
causes of changes in heuristics over time.
Payne (1982) argued that decision making is contingent upon 
the characteristics of choice tasks. Specifically, he suggested two 
types of effects: task effects and context effects. Since structural 
characteristics of choice tasks, such as the number of alternatives, 
the number of attributes, time pressure and information display, 
are fixed or unknown in our data set, we focus instead on possible 
context effects.
Context effects refers to the influence of general characteristics 
of decision problems, and reflects the particular values of the 
alternatives in specific decision sets. Examples of context variables 
are the similarity of alternatives, the quality of alternative sets and 
reference points (cf., Payne et al. 1993). The notion of similarity has 
a rich history (Luce 1977, Tversky 1972) and has been hypothesized 
to affect the information-processing strategies for choice tasks. For 
example, similarity may affect the degree of ease of comparison 
among choice alternatives. In this section, we examine the effect of 
similarity on the usage of heuristics.
We first need to operationalize the notion of similarity. It is 
obvious that alternatives become more similar, (1) as the variance 
of attribute values across alternatives decreases, and (2) when the 
attribute levels have stronger positive correlations. These are among 
the explicit dimensions used by Shugan (1980) to formalize thinking 





















Figure 6. Proportion of households, among those who use the conjunctive 
rule, when their cut-off prices are greater than, or equal to, offered price
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correlation measure is not well defined (although various categorical 
alternatives do exist). We therefore operationalized similarity as the 
variance of attribute values across alternatives.
Regarding the effect of similarity on heuristics usage, Biggs et 
al. (1985) proposed interesting predictions. They predicted that, as 
alternatives become similar, the compensatory rules may be preferred 
to the non-compensatory ones. They argued that if alternatives 
are significantly dissimilar, non-comepensatory heuristics are 
likely to minimize cost of thinking, by allowing decision-makers to 
quickly eliminate dominated alternatives. However, if alternatives 
are similar, non-compensatory heuristics may require many 
comparisons to eliminate alternatives, and compensatory rules are 
more likely to minimize cost of thinking, since these rules allow 
choices to be made in ‘one pass’ by combining weights for attributes 
with attribute values.
However, the reverse may also be possible. Let us suppose that 
attribute values across alternatives are very close to one another. 
In this case, even with well-defined weight structure, it may be 
difficult to use compensatory rules since (1) the difference in terms 
of marginal contribution of attributes can be minuscule, and (2) 
differences in overall evaluation scores of alternatives may also 
become vanishingly small. In this case, in order to choose a utility-
maximizing alternative, decision-makers may need to enact very 
careful trade-off among attributes. Therefore, purportedly optimizing 
rules, such as the compensatory, may lead to higher costs and lower 
benefits than non-compensatory ones. Decision-makers would then 
rightly prefer the conjunctive or disjunctive rules when alternatives 
are very similar.
Motivated by the above, we test the competing hypotheses:
H0:  As attribute value variance across alternatives decreases, 
compensatory rules are preferred.
H1:  As attribute value variance across alternatives decreases, non-
compensatory rules are preferred.
Statistical inference was carried out as follows. Given the modal 
values of zh, ŝ h,t, two data sets were constructed:
 
1.  Data I (Sample size: 5528): Collect samples of ŝ h,t when ŝ h,t–1 = 1, 
t = 1, …, Th, h = 1, …, H, and define 
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2.  Data II (Sample size: 662): Collect samples of ŝ h,t when ŝ h,t–1 ≠ 1, 
t = 1, …, Th, h = 1, …, H, and define 










For both data sets, three explanatory variables with an intercept 






















where vt(C) is a sample variance of C across brands at t.
Next, a probit model was fitted to both data sets. The prior 
distribution for the regression coefficients of wht was N4(0, 20I4). 
Estimation results appear in Table 9. As expected, two data sets 
evidenced opposite signs. In data set I, all explanatory variables, 
variances of feature ad, display, and price, are statistically 
meaningfully different from zero, implying that households tend to 
switch from the linear compensatory rule to the non-compensatory 
rules as the variances of feature ad, display and price across 
brands become smaller. Data set II shows that the coefficient of the 
variance of price is the only explanatory variable different from zero, 
suggesting that as the variance of price becomes larger, households 
tend to switch from the non-compensatory rules to the linear 
compensatory rule.
In summary, Table 9 shows that households in our data set prefer 
compensatory rules to non-compensatory ones when attributes are 
more varied. When attribute variance is small, non-compensatory 
rules are likely to be preferred, and H1 is supported over H0. 
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4. ConClUSionS AnD fUTURe ReSeARCH
This study investigated two issues: heterogeneity and dynamics 
in heuristics usage, using field data. Using a representative set 
of compensatory and non-compensatory heuristics – the linear 
compensatory, the disjunctive and the conjunctive rules – a hidden 
Markov mixture model was developed to capture changes in 
heuristics for each household over time. A unique feature of this 
approach is the ability to study consumers in their ‘endogenous 
environment’, making purchase decisions in the real world, under 
the sorts of constraints ubiquitous in such settings.
We can claim two major findings. First, there exists a great 
deal of heterogeneity in heuristic usage across households. All 
three heuristics seem to be used, although among them the 
linear compensatory is by far the most widely applied, followed 
by the conjunctive and disjunctive rules. Second, and perhaps 
most important, heuristics are evidently changing over time at 
the household-level. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
demonstrate anything like this result using real choice data. 
Several findings of immediate interest to managers emerged as 
well. Many marketing studies have shown that ignoring certain 
empirical effects – purchase acceleration, store-switching, choice 
endogeneity, among others – can systematically bias the measured 
strength of marketing variables. Similarly, here we found that the 
effects of marketing activities can be systematically under-estimated 
Table  9. Probit result for Data I and II
Data I Data II
















Note:  *: estimate; **: standard deviation; ***: [2.5 percentile, 97.5 percentile] 
interval
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if heterogeneity in heuristic usage is not accounted for. We believe 
this is another form of heterogeneity which should enter modelers’ 
arsenal, given that ignoring it introduces predictable biases.
Perhaps most relevant for managerial practice, estimates of 
individual-level cutoffs are of clear use in marketing decision-
making. A large corpus of research in marketing has considered 
reference or reservation prices (e.g., Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). 
Although we have not incorporated them formally here with the 
generality prior research has envisioned their effects, the cutoff 
formulations in the two non-compensatory models act for all intents 
and purposes as reservation levels. An empirical plot of cutoffs 
for various attributes across households provides managers with 
estimates of levels which their target audience deems excessive. In 
this paper, we can supply such levels not only for prices, but any 
marketing mix variable.
Finally, we found that the ‘compensatoriness’ of invoked heuristics 
is related to how much variation there is across attributes. In this 
way, the proposed model helps formalize measures used in the 
cost-of-thinking literature, and provides a method for measuring 
their effects in real choice scenarios. Specifically, echoing a finding 
going back to Shugan (1980), we found that high attribute variance 
favors the use of compensatory heuristics. We believe it would be 
fruitful to see whether this finding holds up in products categories 
with markedly different characteristics and purchase behaviors. 
In addition, we have not attempted to systematically account for 
multiple possible drivers of heuristic usage change over time, but 
would expect that variations in environment, needs, household 
stock, usage occasions or even marketing mix could all be relevant 
correlates. Differentiating among such causes is certainly a fertile 
area for future investigations.
The heuristics considered in this paper hardly include all possible 
heuristics. In some sense, the space of possible heuristics is 
limitless, and it would be a boon to research in the area if some ‘basis’ 
for that space could be rationally or empirically proposed. We have 
taken a tentative first step in that direction with our three reference 
heuristics. Another avenue for further research would be to examine 
how the degrees of heterogeneity and heuristic switching change as 
more heuristics are explicitly modeled. The proposed hidden Markov 
mixture model can accommodate any finite number of heuristics so 
long as they are formulated in mathematically precise language. So 
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we would hope that the general scheme of hidden Markov mixture 
modeling facilitates increased empirical attention on heuristic usage 
by consumers in the real world.
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AppenDix: MCMC eSTiMATion 
Define the following quantities:
 
    • h h hT Hhy y y y y y1 1= ( , , ), = ( , , ) ,′ 
    • h h hT Hhs s s s s s,1 1= ( , , ), = ( , , ) ,′ 
    • ih h t ht s i t T i,= { | = , = 1, , }, = 1, 2, 3,  
    • i ht hh s i t T i= { | = for = 1, , }, = 1, 2, 3,∃   
    • #(A) = the size of a set A,
    • i ih iz z h i
( ) ( )= { | }, = 2, 3.∈
    • h1= ( , ) .β β β′ ′ ′  
The posterior distribution is 
( )TH ihh t ht ht hp s z z y p y s(2) (3) (2) (3) ( )1 =1 =1( , , , , , , , , , | ) ( | , )β βπ β µ φ∆ Σ Ψ Ψ ∝ ×
  
(18)
{ }TH hh h t ht h tp s p s s=1 1 1 =1 , 1( | ) ( | , )π − ∆ ×  
( )hp1 ( | , )β ββ µ Σ ×
( )hp z (2) (2)2 ( | )Ψ ×
( )hp z (3) (3)3 ( | )Ψ ×
p p p p1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )β βπ µ× ∆ × × Σ ×
p p(2) (3)( ) ( ).Ψ × Ψ
To implement a MCMC sampler, we must sample from the 
following conditional posterior distributions in a sequence,
 
1.  Sampling from p s z z y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( | , , , , , , , , , ) :β βπ β µ∆ Σ Ψ Ψ  For each 
h and t, iht h h t h t hT ht ht h ht h t h t hthp s s s s s z y p y s p s s p s s
( )
1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1( | , , , , , , , , , | ) ( | , ) ( | , , ) ( | , , )π β φ π π− + − +∆ ∝ ∆ ∆ 
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i
ht h h t h t hT ht ht h ht h t h t hth
p s s s s s z y p y s p s s p s s( )1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1( | , , , , , , , , , | ) ( | , ) ( | , , ) ( | , , )π β φ π π− + − +∆ ∝ ∆ ∆  . Sample hts {1, 2, 3}∈  with 
probabilities r r r1 2 3( , , )  where ri are normalized probabilities of 
r r r1 2 3( , , ) , where 
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(i), i = 1, 2, 3, must be sampled if the state i is not 
present among ( h h t h t hThs s s s1 , 1 , 1, , , , ,− +  ). In this case, the values of 
ϕh
(i) can easily be sampled by the sampling/importance resampling 
(SIR) method (Rubin 1987, 1988) as follows: (1) sample uhn
(i) from a 
proposal distribution q(ϕh
(i)), n = 1, …, N, and (2) sample one value 
among uh1
(i), …uhN
(i),  with probabilities
i i i i
h h hn hn
N Ni i i i
hl hl hl hll l
u q u u q u
u q u u q u
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
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  where 
i i i i
hn ht ht h hnu p y j s i p u
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) = ( = | = , ) ( | ).π φ Ψ
2.  Sampling from p s z z y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( | , , , , , , , , , )β βπ β µ∆ Σ Ψ Ψ : ( )Hh hp s y p s p Dir l l l1 =1 1 1 1 1 2 3( | , ) ( | ) ( ) = ( , , ),π π π∝
( )Hh hp s y p s p Dir l l l1 =1 1 1 1 1 2 3( | , ) ( | ) ( ) = ( , , ),π π π∝  where i i il l A i= #( ), = 1, 2, 3,+  
with i hA h s i1= { | = }.
3.  Sampling from p s z z y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( | , , , , , , , , , )β βπ β µ∆ Σ Ψ Ψ : For n = 1, 
2 ,  3 ,  mp s y( | , )δ ∝ ( )TH hh t ht h t n n n np s s p Dir d d d=1 =1 , 1 1 2 3( | , ) ( ) = ( , , ),δ− ∆  
where ni ni nid d B= #( )+  with ni h tB h t s n, 1= {( , )| =−  and sht = i, h = 1, 
…, H, t = 1, …, Th}.
4. Sampling from p s z z y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( | , , , , , , , , , )β ββ π µ∆ Σ Ψ Ψ : For each 
household h 1∈ , h ht ht h h
h
p s y p y j s p1( | , ) ( = | = 1, ) ( | , )β ββ β β µ
 ∝ Σ 
 
h ht ht h h
h
p s y p y j s p1( | , ) ( = | = 1, ) ( | , )β ββ β β µ
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 
, which is sampled by the SIR method.
5. Sampling from p z z s y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( , | , , , , , , , , )β βπ β µ∆ Σ Ψ Ψ : For each 
household ih ∈  (i = 2 3),
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h i ht ht h h c
h
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, which is sampled by the SIR 
method.
6. Sampling from p s z z y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( | , , , , , , , , , )β βµ π β∆ Σ Ψ Ψ : hp y( | , , )β βµ β Σ ∝
 
 hp y( | , , )β βµ β Σ ∝
 ( )h Kp p N f V1 ( | , ) ( ) = ( , )β β β β ββ µ µΣ , where hf V V f1 11= ( )β β β β ββ− −Σ +∑
 
hf V V f
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1
= ( )β β β β ββ
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( | , , ) ( | , ) ( ) = ( , )β β β β β β ββ µ β µΣ ∝ Σ Σ∏ ,  where  v v 1= #( )β β + 
 v v 1= #( )β β + 
 and h hS S
1
1
= ( )( ) .β β β ββ µ β µ
−+ − −∑
8. Sampling from p s z z y(2) (3) (2) (3)1( , | , , , , , , , , )β βπ β µΨ Ψ ∆ Σ : Let i im




( ) ( )Ψ ∈ Ψ  denote parameters associated with m-th elements of  zh
(i), m 
 = 1, …, M. Then, ( )i i i im hm m mip z y p z p( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( | , ) ( | ) ( )Ψ ∝ Ψ Ψ . Then, the 
 conditional posterior distributions of Ψm
(i) are (a) 
m mQn
Dir e e1( , , , ),  
 when zhm
(i) is a discrete variable, and i i im m mN f v
( ) ( ) ( )( | , )µ  and i i im m mIG l g
( ) ( ) ( )( | , )σ
i i i
m m mIG l g
( ) ( ) ( )( | , )σ , when zhm
(i) is a continuous variable, where mq mq i mz ri mqhm
e e I q Q( ) == , = 1, ,+ ∑ 
mq mq i mz ri mqhm
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   and i i im m hm m
i
g g z( ) ( ) ( ) 21= ( ) .
2
µ+ −∑
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